Бхаванга и перерождение согласно Абхидхамме

  1. See E.R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception, Colombo, 1961, 75–96 (this is the fullest account); Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed., G.P. Malalasekera et al., Colombo 1961–, s.v. bhavaṅga; Nyanatiloka Thera, Buddhist Dictionary, Colombo, Frewin & Co., 1956, s.v. bhavaṅga; V.F. Gunaratna, “Rebirth Explained”, The Wheel, 167/169, Kandy, 1980; L.S. Cousins, “The Paṭṭhāna and the Development of the Theravādin Abhidhamma”, JPTS, 10, 1981, 22–46, 22–5; S. Collins, Selfless Persons, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, 238–47 (the fullest account in more recent literature).
  2. Nyanatiloka Thera, op. cit., 29. Cf. Gunaratna, op. cit., 23–5; P. De Silva, Buddhist and Freudian Psychology, Colombo, Lake House, 1972, 52–3. De Silva does not explicitly equate bhavaṅga and the unconscious as implied by Collins op. cit., 304, n. 22, he merely discusses the term in this connection and in fact acknowledges that the term is problematic since what scholars have said about it seems contradictory and to involve a certain interpretive element.
  3. See Collins, op. cit., 238–47; P.J. Griffiths, On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem, La Salle, Open Court Publishing Co., 1986, 38–9; Griffiths, quite mistakenly, even goes so far as to state that “bhavaṅga is a type of consciousness that operates with no object” (36).
  4. S. Collins, op. cit., 2, 45.
  5. Collins, op. cit., 243-4: “Certainly, the bhavaṅga is a mental but not conscious phenomenon; but in following the sense of the term ‘unconscious’ further into psychoanalytic theory, the similarity ends. For Freud, the word unconscious was used not only in what he called a ‘descriptive’ sense, but also in a ‘systematic’ sense.’ That is, as he writes, apart from the descriptive sense, in which ‘we call a psychical process unconscious whose existence we are obliged to assume—for some such reason as that we infer it from its effects—but of which we know nothing’, it is also the case that ‘we have come to understand the term “unconscious” in a topographical or systematic sense as well… and have used the word more to denote a mental province rather than a quality of what is mental’. Insofar as the Buddhist concept of bhavaṅga might be thought of as being part of a topographical account of mind, it is so only in relation to a systematic account of perception, and not of motivation. The motivation of action, of course, is the crucial area of psychology for any psychoanalytic theory. While many aspects of the Buddhist attitude to motivation do resemble some Freudian themes, they are nowhere related systematically to bhavaṅga in the Theravāda tradition before modern times. Accordingly, the modern comparison between bhavaṅga and psychoanalytic unconscious must be developed as part of what one might call ‘speculative’ or ‘creative’ Buddhist philosophy, rather than by historical scholarship.”
  6. References to the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha and its commentary are to Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha and Abhidhammattahvibhāvinīṭīkā, ed. by Hammalawa Saddhātissa, PTS, 1989 and to two translations (which do not include the commentary): S.Z. Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, PTS, 191 0; Nārada Mahāthera, A Manual of Abhidhamma, Kandy, 4th edition, 1980.
  7. Visuddhimagga, XIV, 110; Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 13–4; Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, 114–7; Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, 159–74.
  8. Whether one is, from the physiological point of view, conscious or unconscious in fact turns out to have nothing to do with whether one is in bhavaṅga or not; bhavaṅga-citta is contrasted with vīthi- citta or process-consciousness, and active consciousness processes can occur whether one is conscious or unconscious (as in the case of dreams, sec notes 15 and 45 below). Thus bhavaṅga is understood to be a citta and not acittaka; from the Abhidhamma point of view the only times a being is strictly unconscious (acittaka) is in the meditation attainment that leads to rebirth amongst the “unconscious beings” (asañña-satta), when reborn as an unconscious being, and during the attainment of cessation (sañña-vedayita-nirodha or nirodhasamāpatti). The attainment of cessation as being acittaka is discussed by Griffiths (op. cit.); on the asañña-sattas see D, I, 2H, Sv 118; DAṬ, I, 217.
  9. Attasālinī, 63: ārammaṇaṃ cintetī ti cittaṃ.
  10. For a specific reference to bhavaṅga’s having an object see Visuddhimagga, XIV, 114.
  11. Abhidhammāvatāra, 43–48; Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 15–6; Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, 119–22; Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, 181–94.
  12. Strictly during the process of rebirth, it is possible for bhavaṅga briefly—for four consciousness moments—to have a present sense-object; see Visuddhimagga, XVII, 137, 141. The process of death and rebirth is discussed in more detail below.
  13. The so called seven universals (sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa) (Abidhammatthasaṅgaha, 6; Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, 9–5; Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, 77–9). The Dhammasaṅgaṇi might be interpreted as in theory allowing a minimum of six since it does not mention manasikāra at Dhammasaṅgaṇi, 87.
  14. Abhidhammattasaṅgaha, 8–11; Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, 102–10; Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, 127–41.
  15. See Milindapañha, 300; Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā, 406–8.
  16. Visuddhimagga, XlV, 114 states that when no other citta arises interrupting its flow, such as when one has fallen into dreamless sleep, and so on, bhavaṅga occurs endlessly, like a flowing stream (asati santāna-vinivattake aññasmiṃ cittuppāde nadī-sotaṃ viya supinaṃ apassato niddokkamana-kālādīsu aparimāṇa-saṃkhaṃ pi pavattati yevā ti).
  17. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 23 4; Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, 142; Narada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, 242–5.
  18. See Visuddhimagga , XIV, 81–110; Abhidhammāvatāra, 1–15 (citta-niddesa); Abhi- dhammatthasaṅgaha, 1–5 (citta-pariccheda). The schema of eighty-nine classes of citta is distilled by the commentarial tradition from the cittuppādakaṇḍa of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi (9–124), which by exploiting a number of different variables greatly multiplies the number of possible classes.
  19. Kiriya-citta is a class of consciousness that is neither productive of a result (i.e., it is not actively wholesome or unwholesome) nor is it the result of actively wholesome or unwholesome citta: it is neither kamma nor vipāka (see Attasālinī, 293). For the most part, the term thus defines the consciousness of Buddhas and arahants, and consists of seventeen classes of citta that in principle mirror the seventeen classes of actively wholesome citta of the sense, form, and formless spheres. However, there are two classes of kiriya-citta essential to the processes of thinking and that all beings continually experience in ordinary consciousness: citta that adverts to the five sense-doors (kiriya- mano-dhātu. pañca-dvārāvajjana) and citta that adverts to the mind-door (kiriya-mano-viññāṇa- dhātu, manodvārāvajjana).
  20. There are in essence six dhammas that are regarded as hetus: greed (lobha), aversion (dosa), delusion (moha), non-attachment (alobha), friendliness (adosa), and wisdom (amoha). These dhammas are hetus in the sense of being “roots” (mūla) (Attasālinī, 46, 154). Of the eighty-rune classes of citta, eighteen are said to be without hetus (in principle the basic consciousnesses of the sense door process), the remaining seventy-one all arise with either one, two or three hetus. See Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 12–3; Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, 113–4; Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, 154–9.
  21. Twelve akusala and eight kusala from the kāmāvacara, five and four kusala from the rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara respectively, four from the lokuttara.
  22. For the consciousness process in the ancient texts, see: Visuddhimagga, XIV, 110–24, XVII, 120–45, XX, 43–5; Atthasālinī, 266–87; Abhidhammāvatāra, 49–59; Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 17–21. The fullest modern accounts are to be found in: Sarathchandra, op. cit.; Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, 25–53 (this is an important account by a Burn1ese Abhidhamma master which seems in places to be based on continuing Burmese Abhidhamma traditions); Gunaratna, op. cit.; Cousins, op. cit. For briefer summaries, see: Lama Anagarika Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy, London, 1969, 129 –2; W.F. Jayasuriya, The Psychology and Philosophy of Buddhism, Kuala Lumpur, Buddhist Missionary Society, 1976, 100–8; E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, London, 1962, 186–91.
  23. Five varieties each of akusala-vipāka and kusalavipāka sense consciousness.
  24. Two receiving cittas (akusala– and kusalavipāka); three investigating cittas (akusalavipāka and two kusalavipāka). The function of votthapana is performed by the kiriya mano-viññāṇa-dhātu/mano-dvārāvajjana citta.
  25. Attasālinī, 270–1, discusses how in different circumstances tad-ārammaṇa can be termed “root” (mūla) bhavaṅga and “visiting” (āgantuka) bhavaṅga.
  1. Visuddhimagga, XIV, 113–4; Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 13.
  2. The details of what follows are taken primarily from the discussion of the four kinds of paṭisandhi and of kamma (Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 23–6; Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, 139–49; Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, 241–55, but reference has also been made to Attasālinī, 267–88 (275), Abhidhammāvatāra, 49 (vv. 382–3).
  3. Visuddhimagga, XVII, 134: tattha akusala-vipākāya ahetuka-manoviññāṇā-dhātuyā apāyesu paṭisandhi hoti. kusala-vipākāya manussa-loke jacc-andha-jāti-badhira-jāti ummattaka-jāti- eḷamūgnapuṃsakādīnaṃ. aṭṭhahi sahetuka-kāmāvacara-vipākehi kāmāvacara-devesu ceva manussesu ca puññavantānaṃ paṭisandhi hoti. pañcahi rūpāvacara-vipākehi rūpi-brahmaloke. catūhi arūpāvacara-vipākehi arūpa-loke ti yena ca yattha paṭisandhi hoti sā eva tassa anurūpā paṭisandhi nāma. Also cf. Visuddhimagga, XIV, 111–3; incidentally, here wholesome resultant investigating citta is described as the result of weak two-motivationed wholesome kamma (dubbala-dvihetuka-kusala- vipāka).
  4. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 21: duhetukānam ahetukānañ ca panettha kiriyā-javanāni ceva appanā- javanāni ca na labbhanti.
  5. This follows from Buddhadatta’s full exposition of which classes of consciousness are experienced by which kinds of being; see Abhidhammāvatāra, 38–9 (vv. 215– 85).
  1. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 24: “Thus rebirth, bhavaṅga and the mind at death in a single birth are just one and have one object.” (paṭisandhi bhavaṅgañ ca tathā cavana-mānasaṃ | ekam eva tath’ ev’ eka-visayañ c’ eka-jātiya).
  2. The relevant conditions would be nissaya, upanissaya, āsevana.
  3. Visuddhimagga, XIX, 14–16; Abhidhammāvatāra, 117 (v. 1244); Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, 24.
  4. The key to interpreting the list is the comment made with regard to kamma that is kaṭattā: in the absence of the other three, it effects rebirth (Visuddhimagga, XIX, 15: tesaṃ abhāve taṃ paṭisandhiṃ ākaḍḍhati). However, Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭīkā, 130–31 gives the fullest comment: “Therein kamma may be either unwholesome or wholesome; among weighty and unweighty kammas, that which is weighty—on the unwholesome side, kamma such as killing one’s mother, etc., or on the wholesome side, sublime kamma [i.e., the jhāna, etc.]—ripens first, like a great flood washing over lesser waters, even if there are proximate kammas and the rest. Therefore, it is called weighty. In its absence, among distant and proximate kammas, that which is proximate and recalled at the time of death ripens first. There is nothing to say about that which is done close to the time of death. But if this too is absent, among habitual and unhabitual kammas, that which is habitual, whether wholesome or unwholesome, ripens first. But kamma because of performance, which is something repeated, effects rebirth in the absence of the previous [three].” (tattha kusalaṃ vā hotu akusalaṃ vā garukāgarukesu yaṃ garukam akusaa-pakkhe mātughātakādi-kammaṃ kusala-pakkhe mahaggata- kammaṃ vā tad eva paṭhamaṃ vipaccati, sati pi āsannādi-kamme parittaṃ udakaṃ ottharitvā gacchanto mahogho viya. tathā hi taṃ garukan ti vuccati. tasmiṃ asati dūrāsannesu yaṃ āsannaṃ maraṇa-kāle anussaritaṃ tad eva paṭhamaṃ vipaccati. āsanna-kāle kate vattabam eva natthi. tasmiṃ asati āciṇṇānāciṇṇesu ca yaṃ āciṇṇaṃ susīlyaṃ vā dussiīlyaṃ vā tad eva paṭhamaṃ vipaccati. kaṭattā-kammaṃ pana laddhāsevanaṃ purimānaṃ abhāvena paṭisandhiṃ ākaḍḍhati.)
  5. The Visuddhimagga and Abhidhammāvatāra give habitual kamma precedence over death proximate kamma; Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭīkā, 131 acknowledges the discrepancy but argues that the order preserved in Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, makes better sense: “As when the gate of a cowpen full of cattle is opened, although there are steers and bulls behind, the animal close to the gate of the pen, even if it is a weak old cow, gets out first. Thus, even when there are other strong wholesome and unwholesome kammas, because of being close to the time of death, that which is proximate gives its result first and is therefore given here first.” (yathā pana gogaṇa-paripuṇṇassa vajassa dvāre vivaṭe aparabhāge dammagava-balavagavesu santesu pi yo vaja-dvārassa āsanno hoti antamaso dubbalajaragavo pi, so yeva paṭhamataraṃ nikkhamati evaṃ garukato aññesu kusalākusalesu santesu pi, maraṇa-kālassa āsannattā āsannam eva paṭhamaṃ vipākaṃ detī ti idha taṃ paṭhamaṃ vuttaṃ.)
  6. Visuddhimagga , XVII, 133–45; Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā, 155–60; Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha,
  7. Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā, 155–6.
  8. Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā, 156 defines it more specifically as produced skilful and unskillful volition (āyuhitā kusalākusala-cetanā).
  9. Visuddhimagga, XVII, 138, 142; Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā, 158–9. In the context of rebirth in thekāmadhātu the Visuddhimagga and Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā appear to take kamma-nimitta as solely referring to past sense-objects perceived through the mind-door; a present sense-object perceived through one of the five sense-doors seems to be added as a fourth kind of object in addition to kamma, kamma-nimitta and gati-nimitta. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 27 (Nārada, Manual of Abhidhamma, 268), however, states that a kamma-nimitta may be past or present and may be perceived at any of the six doors. This suggests that Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha is taking this fourth kind of object as a kind of kamma-nimitta. This also seems to be the position of Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭīkā, 147, following Ānanda’s Mūlaṭīkā.
  1. M. Nārada, Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 182: dvāra-vimuttānañ ca pana paṭisandhi-bhavaṅga-cuti-saṅkhātānaṃ chabbidhaṃ pi yathā-sambhavaṃ yebhuyyena bhavantare cha-dvāra-gahitaṃ paccuppannam atītaṃ paññatti-bhūtaṃ vā kammaṃ kamma-nimittaṃ gati-nimitta-sammataṃ ālambanaṃ hoti.
  2. P.J. Griffiths, On Being Mindless, 53–4 (my italics).
  3. See Attasālinī, 262–4. There are many examples one could give of this principle: adosa is only to be classified as mettā in certain types of consciousness; tatra-majjhattatā is only to be classified as upekkhā in certain types of consciousness. Again, the dhammas covered by such groupings as the bojjhaṅgas maggaṅgas, etc., are only to be designated as such in certain circumstances. The distinction between the otherwise identical lists of the indriyas and balas is made by reference to their relative strengths or intensity in both the Theravādin and Vaibhāṣika systems. The notion of adhipati only makes sense if the strength of dhammas can vary. See R.M.L. Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening: A Study of the Bodhipakkhiyā Dhammā, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1992, 85–7, 141–5, 156–60, 315–7, 306–7, 338–9.
  4. Abhidhammāvatāra, 16: tattha kāmāvacara-citta-sampayuttā kāmā-vacarā. Ibid., 22: rūpāvacara-citta-sampayuttā rūpāvacarā… eva rūpa-avacara-kusala-cetasikā veditabbā.
  1. Visuddhimagga, XIV, 130. Buddhaghosa makes the same point with regard to other dhammas of the aggregate of saṅkhāras at Visuddhimagga, XIV, 132. Buddhadatta comments that in the context of unwholesome consciousness vitakka, viriya and samādhi are to be distinguished as wrong thought (micchā-saṅkappa), wrong effort (micchā-vāyāma) and wrong concentration (micchā-samādhi) (Abhidhammattha-vibhāvinīṭīkā, 24).
  2. One of the clearest example of distinctions being made between different instances of essentially the same citta is in the case of dream consciousness. The same wholesome and unwholesome cittas occur in dreams as in waking consciousness, but when they occur in dreams, although they still constitute wholesome and unwholesome kanma, it is only very feeble kamma, thus one does not have to worry about committing pārājika offences in one’s dreams. See Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā, 408.
  3. Abhidhammāvatāra, 4, v. 27: sattarasa-sahassāni dve satāni asīti ca | kāmāvacara paññāni bhavantī ti viniddise ||
  4. Visuddhimagga, XVII, 133–45.
  5. Sarathchandra, op. cit., 88-96; L. de La Vallée Poussin, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, Paris, 1926, I, 178–9, 196. P. W11liams sums up the nature of the ālaya-vijñāna as follows: “The substratum consciousness is an ever-changing stream which underlies saṃsāric existence. It is said to be ‘perfumed’ by phenomenal acts, and the seeds which are the result of this perfuming reach fruition at certain times to manifest as good, bad, or indifferent phenomena. The substratum consciousness, seen as a defiled form of consciousness (or perhaps subconsciousness), is personal in a sense, individual, continually changing and yet serving to give a degree of personal identity and to explain why it is that certain karmic results pertain to this particular individual.” (Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, London, Routledge, 1989, 91).
  6. See L. Cousins, op. cit., 22; L. Schmithausen. Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy, Tokyo, 1987, I, 7–8 The relevant texts are the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa §35, see E. Lamotte, ‘Le traité de l’acte de Vasubandhu’, MCB, 4, 1936, 250, and the Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā (here the notion is ascribed to the Mahīśāsakas—see L. Schmithausen, op. cit., II, 255–6, n. 68). The notion of bhavaṅga is not mentioned by Asaṅga in the earlier Mahāyānasaṃgraha (which makes Schmithausen sceptical about the influence of the notion on the development of the concept of ālaya-vijñāna), but is added by the commentator (sec É. Lamotte, La somme du grand véhicule, Louvain, 1938, II, 28, 8*); the notion is also cited by Hsüan-tsang (see La Vallée Poussin, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, 1, 178– 9).
  7. On the question of whether or not the ālaya-vijñāna has objects, see P.J. Griffiths, op. cit., 95–6.
  8. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, I, 97–8: “II est vipākaphala, le ‘fruit de rétribution’ des actes bons ou mauvais qui projettent une existence dans une certaine sphère d’existence, dans une certaine destinée, par une certaine matrice.”
  9. op. cit.: “Le Sūtra dit que, à la conception et à la mort, les êtres ne sont pas sans pensée (acittaka) … La pensée de la conception et de la mort ne peut être que le huitème vijñāna … En ces deux moments, la pensée et le corps sont ‘hébétés’ comme dans le someil sans rêve (asvapnikā nidrā) et dans l’extrême stupeur.”
  10. Aṅguttara-nikāya, I, 10: pabhassaraṃ idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ. taṃ assutavā puthujjano yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti. tasmā assutavato puthujjanassa citta-bhāvanā natthī ti vadāmī ti. pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttaṃ. taṃ sutavā ariya-sāvako yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. tasmā sutavato ariya- sāvakassa citta-bhāvanā atthī ti vadāmī ti.
  11. In particular, the Mahāsāṃghika, the Vibhajyavāda and the school of the Śāriputrābhidharma; see A. Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule, Saigon, 1955, 67–8, 175, 194; É. Lamotte, L’enseignement de Vimalakīrti, Louvain, 1962, 52–3.
  12. II §28, Nanjio ed., Kyoto, 1923, 77; cf. Lamotte, L’enseignement de Vimalakīrti, 54.
  13. VI §82, Nanjio, ed., 221–3.
  14. P. Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism, 92–3.
  15. Manorathapūraṇī, I, 60; cf. Atthasālinī, 140.
  16. Manorathapūraṇī, I, 60: upakilitthan [sic] ti. upakkiliṭṭhaṃ nāmā ti. kathaṃ. yathā hi sīlavanto vā ācāra-sampannā mātā-pitaro vā ācariyupajjhāyā vā dussīlānaṃ durācārānaṃ avatta-sampannānaṃ puttānañ ceva antevāsika-saddhivihārikānañ ca vasena attano putte vā antevāsika-saddhivihārike vā na tajjenti na sikkhāpenti na ovadanti nānusāsantī ti avaṇṇaṃ akittiṃ labhanti. evaṃ sampadaṃ idaṃ veditabbaṃ. ācāra-sampannā mātā-pitaro viya hi ācariyupajjhāyā viya ca bhavaṅga-cittaṃ daṭṭhabaṃ. puttādīnaṃ vasena tesaṃ akitti-lābho viya javana- kkhaṇe rajjana-dussana-muyhana- sabhāvānaṃ lobha-sahagatādi-cittānaṃ vasena uppannehi āgantukehi upakkilesehi pakati- parisuddhaṃ pi bhavaṅga-cittaṃ upakkiliṭṭhaṃ nāma hotī ti.
  17. Atthasālinī, 140: tato nikkhantattā pana akusalam pi gaṅgāya nikkhantā gaṅgā viya godhāvarīto nikkhantā godhāvarī viya ca paṇḍaraṃ tveva vuttaṃ.


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